Arnett also lends support to Levinas's self-definition as a 'phenomenologist.' He repeatedly draws attention to Levinas's substitution of "the phenomenology of the face" for an actual face as hinted at by the declaration in Ethics and Infinity that " [t] he best way of encountering the Other is not even to notice the color of his eyes!" Ignorance concerning the color of the eyes of the Other depersonalizes the Other and rightly suggests that Levinas's desire is to move as rapidly as possible from the personal to the universal. His intention is not to celebrate an egotistical 'I' who relishes the chance to reach out to the hurting, disadvantaged and oppressed, but rather to emphasize that, like it or not, 'I am my brother's keeper.' This assertion is, as Arnett stresses, the fulcrum of Levinas's project: "the ongoing and unending enactment of a phenomenological ethical reality" (60). It is not like one of Kant's versions of the categorical imperatives imposed on the individual as a rule. It is a fact. Whether I actually see my brother face-to-face or whether I have to conjure up his (or her) face with my imagination, "I am my brother's keeper.' I am not, therefore, a post-Enlightenment 'originative I' but a 'derivative I' called upon to answer a request for an ethical responsibility toward another human being.
Arnett stresses the idea in Levinas's work the question of how to respond to the face of the Other cannot be dissociated from the need for justice. The tension between ethics and the call for justice thus becomes the subject-matter of a chapter on Umberto Eco's The Name of the Rose. Levinas's model, according to Arnett, "rejects any polarity between ethics and justice. For it is the tension between them and obligations of both that call forth the life worth living" (148). Arnett shows how following "the Saying of a spiritual awakening" while moderating a dispute between the Franciscans and the papacy, the character William is able to represent "a voice of the Said of justice" (154). Along this path William is able to make use of the library as information-gathering is essential in the interests of justice, but the library in Eco's novel is also the sight of impurity. Perhaps all libraries, like justice itself according to Levinas, are impure? Arnett makes use of Levinas's theory to support the idea that Eco's character can only hope to be successful if he broadens the frame of reference to include not just self and Other but a wide range of disparate often non-present others.
It seems ironical that Arnett approaches Levinas's work through the prism of rhetoric given Levinas's frequently voiced rejection of rhetoric -indeed, the word 'ethics' occurs far more often than the word 'rhetoric' throughout the book; but Arnett justifies his approach by claiming that Levinas "offers an ethics that works rhetorically to demand responsibility from each one of us" (7). Readers of Levinas's Rhetorical Demand may be left wondering how, given the traditional link between rhetoric and persuasion, ethics can ever work otherwise than rhetorically.
Similarly, in Arnett's reading of Levinas, the role of the spiritual is unclear. Although he works strenuously to deny any link between Levinas and mysticism, Arnett frequently locates a spiritual dimension in Levinas's ethics. He claims, for example, that Levinas is able to find "[e]ven in the heart of horrors and barbarities … traces of a revelatory Saying" (13); and he portrays Levinas's version of ethics as only coming alive when the face or call of the Other is able to trigger in me "a spiritual awakening" that prompts me to boldly respond, "I am here." Although Arnett quite rightly points out that for Levinas (as for Kant) there is no "godhead that determines the validity of individual action" (125), the formulation "I am my brother's keeper" inevitably has a religious echo. Perhaps more credit should be given to the God who often hovers in the margins of these pages, for without Him, and without my acknowledging Him, there may never be any "spiritual awakening" prompting me to respond to the face or call of the Other in the most beautiful and appropriate way imaginable. Despite his reluctance to engage in depth with the murky question of Levinas's positioning in relation to spirituality, Arnett increases our understanding in particular of how Levinas's call for human beings to acknowledge and act upon their responsibility for the Other is inseparable from the character of Levinas, the man.
